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TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN MISSOURI:  IS IT TIME FOR 
BLIGHT AND BUT-FOR TO GO? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Westfield America, Inc. (Westfield), a publicly-traded real estate 
investment trust (REIT), owns significant interests in thirty-nine major U.S. 
shopping centers known as “Westfield Shoppingtowns.”1 These 
“Shoppingtowns,” which serve over ten percent of the U.S. population, 
currently account for 35.6 million square feet of leased retail space and house 
4800 specialty stores.2  Moreover, Westfield’s “Funds From Operations” 
totaled more than $177 million in 1999, making Westfield one of the largest 
REITs engaged in the shopping center leasing business.3 
In 1997, Westfield acquired West County Center shopping mall in Des 
Peres, Missouri, the second wealthiest municipality in the St. Louis area.4  
Soon after acquiring West County Center, Westfield announced a $200 million 
redevelopment plan for the mall.5  The planned development would double the 
shopping center’s size to approximately 1.2 million square feet and add 
upscale shopping stores such as Lord & Taylor and Nordstrom as anchor 
tenants.6 Westfield sought public financing assistance for the West County 
Center project from the City of Des Peres in the form of tax increment 
financing (TIF).7 
 
 1. WESTFIELD AMERICA, INC., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2000), available at 
http://www.westfieldamerica.com. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 33.  “Funds From Operations” is defined as net income (loss), excluding gains (or 
losses) from debt restructuring and sales of property, plus real estate related depreciation and 
amortization and after adjustments for unconsolidated real estate affiliates.  “Funds From 
Operations” does not directly equate with net profit.  Id. 
 4. Dan Mihalopoulos & Fred Faust, West County Center Pushes to be Declared Blighted, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 30, 1997 (Zone West), at A1.  Des Peres was the second 
wealthiest suburban St. Louis municipality, after Ladue, based on figures for median income and 
residential property value. The median income of Des Peres residents was $74,901 in 1994 and its 
average residential property value exceeded $173,000.  Id. 
 5. Linda Billingsly, Hearing Set on Mall’s Rebuilding Panel Will Tackle 3 Key Questions, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 30, 1997 (Zone West), at A1. 
 6. See Mihalopoulos & Faust, supra note 4.  The Nordstrom’s would be the first built in the 
St. Louis area.  Id. 
 7. Id.  It was not unexpected for Westfield to request TIF funds for the mall.  In states with 
TIF, nearly all cities with populations over 50,000 use TIF in some fashion.  Jeffrey I. Chapman, 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1020 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:1019 
TIF, a statutory mechanism permitting public financing of private 
redevelopment projects, is common for large-scale redevelopment projects 
such as Westfield’s West County Center initiative.8  Specifically, TIF works by 
permitting incremental tax revenues—i.e., the additional taxes generated by the 
redevelopment itself—to be diverted from traditional taxing jurisdictions, such 
as school districts and police and fire departments, to defray up-front costs of 
the project.9  This fiscal bootstrapping technique unique to TIF is enormously 
popular with municipal governments seeking to finance real estate 
development without raising general taxes or withdrawing existing tax 
revenues from traditional taxing jurisdictions.10 
By statute, however, TIF is restricted to certain types of development.11  
Most importantly, TIF is limited to projects that will eradicate blight or, in the 
alternative, halt the advance of blight.12  Therefore, in Missouri as well as most 
other states, TIF statutes call for the municipality’s governing body to meet 
certain tests prior to authorizing TIF.13  The municipality must issue findings 
that “the redevelopment area on the whole is a blighted area, a conservation 
area, or an economic development area” (the “blighting test”) and that the 
redevelopment area “has not been subject to growth and development through 
investment by private enterprise and would not reasonably be anticipated to be 
developed without the adoption of tax increment financing” (the “but-for” 
test).14  These tests, coupled with an array of procedural requirements, form the 
heart of Missouri’s TIF statute and are the principal tests required of any 
municipality to proceed with the use of TIF on a redevelopment initiative. 
 
Tax Increment Financing as a Tool of Redevelopment, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX AND LAND 
USE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 184 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1998). 
 8. Gary H. Feder, Recent Trends and Municipal Government Perspectives, in MAJOR LAND 
USE LAWS IN MISSOURI 63 (1999).  One commentator stated: “[I]n most instances today in this 
region, market forces alone do not support the [redevelopment] project.  Except for rare instances, 
all projects receive some form of assistance.”  Michael Lazaroff, Remarks at the St. Louis 
Regional Economic Forecast (Oct. 15, 1999), in ST. LOUIS BUS. J., Oct. 22, 1999, at 95, available 
at 1999 WL 24027263. 
 9. SAM CASELLA, AMERICAN PLANNING ASS’N, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING: WHAT IS 
TIF? 1 (1984).  For a fuller discussion of the workings of TIF, see infra text accompanying notes 
60-118. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See JIM CULOTTA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, TAX INCREMENT 
FINANCING: AN ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FINANCING TECHNIQUE 1 (2000). 
 12. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805 (Supp. 1998).  The area must be either a “blighted area” or 
an area that is not yet blighted, but is still “detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or 
welfare, and may become a blighted area.”  Id. § 99.805(3). 
 13. See id. § 99.810. 
 14. Id. § 99.810(1).  For a more complete description of the “blighting test” and for 
definitions of what constitutes blighted areas, conservation areas and economic development 
areas, see infra text accompanying notes 111-117. 
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In the West County Center situation, the Des Peres Board of Aldermen 
declared that West County Center was “blighted” and met the requirements of 
the but-for test.15  Based on these findings, Des Peres ultimately approved 
$28.9 million in TIF for Westfield’s proposed redevelopment.16  The decision 
to award the TIF funds precipitated a maelstrom of controversy in the St. Louis 
area.17 Opponents derided the project as an unnecessary giveaway to deep-
pocketed developers,18 and legislators grappled with overhauling TIF’s 
statutory framework in response to the perceived misuse of TIF on projects 
such as West County Center.19 
In fact, certain Des Peres residents, together with The Jacobs Group, the 
owner of a rival mall in suburban St. Louis, sued the City of Des Peres based 
on the Westfield TIF.20  The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment 
invalidating the ordinances passed by Des Peres which authorized the 
development and an injunction preventing Des Peres from utilizing TIF on the 
project.21  The plaintiffs argued that West County Center could not rationally 
be declared “blighted” when the mall had near 100% occupancy and annual 
sales topped $100 million, and that the subsidizing of the mall through TIF 
funds amounted to unfair competition.22  Plaintiffs also argued that Westfield, 
“one of the largest shopping center owners in the world,” had the economic 
ability to complete the redevelopment project without public subsidy.23  The 
 
 15. Dan Mihalopoulos, West County Center Expansion Wins Approval, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Dec. 19, 1997, at C1. 
 16. Id.  Westfield initially requested more than $50 million in TIF for the project.  Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Editorial, Time To End TIF Giveaway, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 24, 
1997, at B6; Kenneth P. Thomas, Editorial, Without Reform, Tax Increment Financing Makes No 
Sense, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 10, 2000, at B7. 
 18. See Time To End TIF Giveaway, supra note 17.  This editorial labeled the TIF to 
Westfield a “dubious handout.”  But see Andrew Morris, Editorial, True Meaning of TIFs, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 29, 1997, at 36. 
 19. See Phil Sutin, A Group of Area Lawmakers Sets Aside Political Differences to Forge 
Unity on Regional Goals, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 10, 2000, at B1.  The effort to 
statutorily limit TIF is ongoing.  Proposals have focused on limiting TIF to areas of pervasive 
poverty or high unemployment.  However, these proposals have not achieved the necessary 
consensus among state lawmakers.  The primary problem with the legislative proposals thus far is 
that the proposals would limit TIF to “narrowly defined pockets without inadvertently excluding 
other areas needing (tax increment financing) to overcome development obstacles.”  Id.  In light 
of the legislative impasse, this Comment suggests an alternative method to reforming Missouri’s 
TIF statute that would not limit TIF to only certain municipalities. 
 20. William C. Lhotka, One Mall Challenges Another’s Use of TIF Money, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, July 26, 1998, at D1.  See also John Gibeaut, The Money Chase: Municipalities Love 
Using Tax Breaks to Lure New Businesses, But Sweetheart Deals Have Lawyers for School 
Districts and Industry Rivals Raising Red Flags, 85 A.B.A. J. 58, 61 (March 1999). 
 21. JG St. Louis West L.L.C. v. City of Des Peres, No. ED77037, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, 
at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2001). 
 22. Id. at *4.  See also Gibeaut, supra note 20, at 61. 
 23. Lhotka, supra note 20. 
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suit, apparently the first of its kind in the United States, “stunned” certain 
municipal law experts.24 
However, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ request to enjoin the TIF 
subsidy.25  On appeal, the decision was affirmed.26  In its opinion, the Missouri 
Court of Appeals noted that while “it is illogical to label as an economic 
liability a commercial enterprise that is indisputably [the] City’s greatest 
economic asset,” the court was unwilling to strike down the allocation of TIF 
dollars by the municipality to the developer on legal grounds.27  Emphasizing 
that it would not interfere with the “fairly debatable” legislative decision made 
by Des Peres’ Board of Aldermen, the court thus allowed Westfield to proceed 
with the redevelopment of the shopping mall with the TIF subsidy.28 
This Comment argues that rules of statutory construction and 
considerations of public policy—namely, judicial deference to matters of 
municipal policy-making—propelled the court’s decision in JG St. Louis West 
L.L.C. v. City of Des Peres.  In other words, the outcome in JG St. Louis West 
was a predictable one, beginning with TIF’s expansive statutory language and 
solidified by long-standing policies mandating judicial deference to 
“legislative decisions” made at the local level.  However, while the court’s 
decision makes sense in light of these principles, this Comment argues that the 
TIF statute, and by implication the court’s decision in JG St. Louis West, has 
eliminated traditional and even common-sense notions of blight that are more 
logical and intuitive than the current blighting and but-for tests.  To correct this 
situation, this Comment advocates discarding the blighting and but-for tests 
completely, or, alternatively, replacing these tests with a more intuitive, 
rational standard befitting the current conception of TIF as an all-purpose 
development tool.  In conjunction with aligning TIF with its broad present-day 
purposes, this Comment also advocates providing additional subsidies or 
incentives to the urban “slum” areas that TIF was originally intended to help 
but largely failed to reach. 
In light of this argument, this Comment is divided into seven sections, 
including this Introduction.  Section II provides a brief history of TIF, focusing 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *1.  However, the circuit court judge 
suggested that the use of TIF in conjunction with the Shoppingtown’s renovation could be “bad 
public policy.”  Dan Mihalopoulos, A Winner is Declared in Suburban Mall War, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1999, at E1.  Specifically, the judge stated: “The court has limited and, 
in this court’s judgment, inadequate authority to test . . . the appropriateness of the actions . . . of 
the Board of Aldermen, when that board acts seemingly as a bank board of directors, as opposed 
to acting as a legislative body with police powers.”  William C. Lhotka, Judge OK’s West County 
Center Subsidy, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 8, 1999, at A1. 
 26. JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *21. 
 27. Id. at *8. 
 28. Id. 
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on the evolution of TIF from a fairly limited redevelopment tool for the 
removal of “urban slum” conditions to an all-purpose economic development 
engine.  Section III examines the basic structure and workings of TIF, first 
looking at TIF’s mechanical operation, and then examining the requirements of 
Missouri’s Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Development Act.29  
Section IV looks at the advantages and disadvantages of TIF, from both 
developer and the municipal perspectives..  Section V provides an overview of 
Missouri case law dealing with “blighting” statutes, focusing on the JG St. 
Louis West decision.  Finally, Section VI provides an explanation of the forces 
driving the outcome of the recent TIF litigation, and considers two alternative 
avenues for legislative reform—either dropping the blighting and but-for tests 
completely, or revising the tests into a more workable, intellectually honest 
approach. 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
States have employed TIF for nearly forty years for a wide variety of 
development projects.30  However, in TIF’s early years, it was used for fairly 
limited purposes:  the clearance and rehabilitation of urban decay in downtown 
areas.31  Only in the past twenty years, due to changing economic conditions 
and increasing reliance on business subsidies, has TIF become an all-purpose 
economic development tool.32 
California was the first state to legislate TIF in 1952.33  TIF was instituted 
in California after voters failed to approve a local match for federal urban 
renewal funds.34  Local officials, seeking alternative methods to tap into the 
 
 29. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 99.800–.865 (1994). 
 30. See Chapman, supra note 7, at 182. 
 31. Id.  See also CULOTTA, supra note 11, at 1. 
 32. This, in turn, has lead TIF to be more closely scrutinized by legal scholars proposing a 
wide range of solutions to perceived TIF abuses.  See, e.g., Julie A. Goshorn, Note, In A TIF: 
Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment Financing Reform, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 919 (1999) (arguing 
that TIF abuse by municipalities and developers could be curbed by statutory amendments that 
limit TIF to areas of “pervasive poverty” or high crime); Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious 
Development: Tax Increment Financing and Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV. 
LITIG. 145 (1998) (arguing that compelled transfers of land via eminent domain for the purpose 
of redevelopment—in conjunction with TIF—constitutes “economically motivated 
condemnation” lacking a public purpose); Catherine Michel, Note, Brother, Can You Spare a 
Dime: Tax Increment Financing in Indiana, 71 IND. L.J. 457 (1996) (arguing that legislative 
reform is necessary to make TIF more responsive to community interests); Joseph F. Luther, 
Comment, Tax Increment Financing: Municipalities Avoiding Voter Accountability, DETROIT 
C.L. REV. 89 (1987) (arguing that TIF violates certain states’ constitutional provisions concerning 
voter approval of new municipal debt). 
 33. KENNETH HUBBELL & PETER J. EATON, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC INFORMATION, 
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN THE STATE OF 
MISSOURI 1 (1997). 
 34. Chapman, supra note 7, at 190. 
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federal funds, devised TIF as a substitute method of obtaining the local match.  
However, officials recognized that the viability of TIF as a financing 
mechanism continued even after the federal programs were completed.35  
Therefore, California development authorities experimented with TIF in 
conjunction with other, privately financed property redevelopment projects.36  
California’s success with TIF on these projects led many other states to adopt 
the TIF mechanism.37 
California and other states initially utilized TIF in a conservative fashion.38  
TIF projects were generally not speculative in nature, but rather were based on 
pre-existing tax flows.39 Moreover, nearly all states with TIF were using TIF 
solely in urban slum areas clearly meeting the statutory requirements of the 
blighting and but-for tests.40  TIF was used in these urban areas in a 
predictable, straightforward manner for the construction of commercial and 
retail business spaces and also for low-income housing projects.41 
However, political and economic pressures, and increasing reliance on 
business incentives to capture business activity, forced cities to experiment 
with broader applications of TIF.42  Business interests increasingly viewed 
TIF, along with other development incentives, as a necessity for certain types 
of large-scale redevelopment projects.43  Moreover, federal economic 
development funds were eliminated in the 1970s and 1980s, forcing cities with 
aging commercial and residential infrastructures to find creative financing 
methods to entice new development.44  Under these conditions, TIF was 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. See George Lefcoe, When Governments Become Land Developers: Notes on the Public-
Sector Experience in the Netherlands and California, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 165, 172 (1978). 
 37. Indeed, by 1994, TIF was being utilized by 5400 agencies in forty-four states.  Chapman, 
supra note 7, at 184.  See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-74.4-2 (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-
14-1 (Michie 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.19 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1770 
(1992). 
 38. DAVID A. WILCOX & DAVID E. VERSEL, ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, REVIEW 
OF BEST PRACTICES FOR TAX-INCREMENT FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1999) (on file 
with the Saint Louis University Law Journal). 
 39. Id.  In other words, the incremental taxes were in some sense “guaranteed” by the 
federally funded projects.  For a fuller discussion of debt instruments in relation to TIF, see infra 
text accompanying notes 67-74. 
 40. CULOTTA, supra note 11, at 2. 
 41. Chapman, supra note 7, at 182. 
 42. CULOTTA, supra note 11, at 2. 
 43. See HUBBELL & EATON, supra note 33, at 1. 
 44. CULOTTA, supra note 11, at 1; see also JOHN BRANCAGLIONE & CAROL LEVINSON, 
NATIONAL BUSINESS INSTITUTE, THE MYTH AND REALITY OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 75 
(1999). 
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viewed as one of the few remaining effective tools available to municipalities 
seeking to jump-start property redevelopment.45 
As TIF became a more recognized and all-inclusive development tool, and 
federal subsidies continued to wither, states sought to enhance TIF’s 
flexibility.  For instance, the traditional funding mechanism of TIF was 
broadened in many states to include other community tax bases as well as 
property taxes.46  Thus, local governments were allowed to earmark local sales 
taxes, earning taxes, and other business revenues, along with property taxes, as 
the “incremental tax revenues” available to fund TIF projects.47  This, in turn, 
allowed TIF to be utilized on a wider variety of projects, including commercial 
retail projects, which generate significant sales tax revenue.48 
Clearly, by the 1990s TIF was something of an all-purpose developmental 
tool.  In fact, TIF was increasingly viewed not only as a device for the removal 
of blight, but rather, as a tool capable of eliminating “fiscal stress” placed upon 
urban and suburban municipalities.49  Fiscal stress results from financial 
obligations incurred by municipalities seeking to provide costly services, 
including police protection, trash removal, and infrastructure improvements, to 
residents and businesses.50  Faced with mounting fiscal stress, municipalities 
recognized that TIF would be one way to finance new development or 
redevelopment without raising general taxes or expending additional out-of-
pocket funds.51 
Missouri enacted its TIF statute, the Real Property Tax Increment 
Allocation Redevelopment Act,52 in 1982.  Missouri’s statute is substantially 
similar to statutes found in many other states, and resulted in over 100 TIF 
redevelopment districts.53  These TIF districts are mainly concentrated in 
Missouri’s metropolitan areas.54  For instance, as of August 2000, Kansas City 
 
 45. See Marc Jolin et al., Tax Increment Financing: Urban Renewal of the 1990s, 32 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 81, 83 (1998); see also Tim Fischesser, Editorial, Effort to Reform TIF 
Could Hurt St. Louis City and County, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 1, 2000, at B7. 
 46. CULOTTA, supra note 11, at 2. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text for additional discussion of this point. 
 49. See Chapman, supra note 7, at 186. 
 50. Id.  Cities gauge fiscal stress in relation to the experiences of other municipalities.  
Chapman states: “It is also evident that some jurisdictions are more fiscally stressed than others.  
While ‘unstressed’ jurisdictions may consistently run budget surpluses, others are continually 
dipping into contingency accounts, borrowing from separate funds, instituting an array of new 
fees and charges, dramatically reducing services, or allowing public infrastructure to deteriorate.”  
Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 99.800–.865 (1994). 
 53. Dan Mihalopoulos, TIF Laws Bring Blight to Affluent Areas, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
April 8, 1997, at A1. 
 54. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
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established thirty-seven TIF districts.55  St. Louis has established more than 
forty such districts.56  Also, the use of TIF in Missouri has increased sharply in 
recent years.57  For instance, in Kansas City, seven TIF plans were approved 
between 1982 and 1991, but eighteen plans were approved between 1992 and 
1997.58  Based on these figures, it is clear that TIF is continuing to expand in 
Missouri.59 
III.  THE BASICS OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
A. The TIF Mechanism—“Freezing,” PILOTs, EAV and EATS 
As mentioned earlier, TIF enables a municipality to use additional 
incremental tax revenues generated by a development project to finance the 
upfront costs of the development itself.60  Specifically, TIF is set in motion 
when a municipality acts to “freeze” the tax values on a subject property or 
contiguous areas at a pre-development level—the initial “equalized assessed 
value” (EAV).61  Taxes paid up to the EAV are still collected and paid to the 
appropriate taxing jurisdictions, such as the school district or police district.62  
Thus, these taxing jurisdictions are not deprived of any revenue per se, in that 
they receive the same amount apportioned to them prior to the redevelopment 
project.63  On the other hand, taxes collected above the initial EAV resulting 
from the improvements to the property, i.e., the incremental taxes, are paid into 
a Special Allocation Fund established by the municipality.64  The taxes paid 
 
 55. OFFICE OF THE CITY AUDITOR, CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, PERFORMANCE 
AUDIT: REVIEW OF THE 1999 TIF ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2000) (on file with the Saint Louis 
University Law Journal) [hereinafter 2000 PERFORMANCE AUDIT]. 
 56. Mihalopoulos, supra note 53. 
 57. OFFICE OF THE CITY AUDITOR, CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, PERFORMANCE 
AUDIT: TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 5 (1998) (on file with the Saint Louis University Law 
Journal) [hereinafter 1998 PERFORMANCE AUDIT]. 
 58. Id. 
 59. TIF is gaining in popularity in other states as well.  For instance, in Illinois, over 300 TIF 
districts have been established.  Michael T. Peddle, TIF in Illinois: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Ugly, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441, 441 (1997).  Nearly sixty percent were instituted after 1987.  Id.  
In California, the tax increment was $400 million in 1984-85.  By 1992-93, however, the 
increment had tripled to $1.5 billion.  Chapman, supra note 7, at 190-91. 
 60. See Feder, supra note 8, at 63. 
 61. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.855 (1994). 
 62. Chapman, supra note 7, at 183. 
 63. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.855.1 (1994). 
 64. Id. § 99.805(15) (Supp. 1998).  The “Special Allocation Fund” is defined as “the fund of 
a municipality or its commission which contains at least two separate segregated accounts for 
each redevelopment plan, maintained by the treasurer of the municipality or the treasurer of the 
commission into which payments in lieu of taxes are deposited in one account, and economic 
activity taxes and other revenues are deposited in the other account.”  Id. 
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into the Special Allocation Fund are known as “payments in lieu of taxes” 
(PILOTs), as they do not specifically constitute tax payments.65 
In almost every case, municipalities will issue bonds for a TIF project and 
use the funds generated by the bond issue to pay off the project’s up-front 
development costs.66  In turn, the money in the Special Allocation Fund (made 
as PILOTs) is generally used to pay off principal and interest on the bond 
issue.67  Primarily, revenue bonds are issued in conjunction with TIF.68  Under 
a revenue bond financing arrangement, the revenue generated by the project 
itself would serve as security for the bonds.69  Like most other states, Missouri 
does not allow for general obligation bonds to be issued for TIF projects.70  
General obligation bonds are bonds secured by the “full faith and credit” of the 
issuing municipality and therefore represent an additional risk to the issuing 
municipality, because if incremental taxes are insufficient to pay off the 
 
 65. Id. § 99.805(10).  Payments in lieu of taxes are specifically defined as: 
 [T]hose estimated revenues from real property in the area selected for a redevelopment 
project, which revenues according to the redevelopment project or plan are to be used for 
a private use, which taxing districts would have received had a municipality not adopted 
tax increment allocation financing, and which would result from levies made after the 
time of the adoption of tax increment allocation financing during the time the current 
equalized value of real property in the area selected for the redevelopment project exceeds 
the total initial equalized value of real property in such area until the designation is 
terminated pursuant to subsection 2 of section 99.850. 
Id. 
 66. See CASELLA, supra note 9, at 1.  To gain credibility in the bond market, it may be 
necessary for the municipality to show some guarantee that it will generate a substantial enough 
increment to cover principal and interest costs of bonds.  Of course, at the time of the issuance of 
the bonds, there would likely be no increment because the project has not reached fruition.  
Therefore, the developers or the municipality may have to dedicate funds to “jump start” the 
project and lend credibility to their efforts.  Chapman, supra note 7, at 184. 
 67. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.850 (1994).  Chapman deems TIF to be “self-financing” at 
least to a certain extent: “The increment in land value generates the revenue to pay for the debt 
that was used to finance the expenditures that helped to cause the increment in land value.”  
Chapman, supra note 7, at 184. 
 68. See MO. REV. STAT. §99.835 (Supp. 1998).  Revenue bonds are “tax-exempt, long-term 
obligations issued by public bodies.”  M. DAVID GELFAND & PETER W. SALSICH, JR., STATE AND 
LOCAL TAXATION AND FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL 154 (1985). 
 69. GELFAND & SALSICH, supra note 68, at 155.  Revenue bonds are not backed by the 
taxing authority of the municipality, and they are generally payable through revenues generated 
on specific projects financed by the bonds.  Id. at 154. 
 70. MO. REV. STAT. §99.835.5 states: 
The obligations issued pursuant to sections 99.800 to 99.865 shall not be a general 
obligation of the municipality, county, state of Missouri, or any political subdivision 
thereof, nor in any event shall such obligation be payable out of any funds or properties 
other than those specifically pledged as security therefor.  The obligations shall not 
constitute indebtedness within the meaning of any constitutional, statutory or charter debt 
limitation or restriction. 
Id. 
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principal and interest of the bond, the city must find additional revenue sources 
or risk default.71 
Municipalities, however, are not limited to bond financing arrangements.  
In the alternative, municipalities may use their own funds to pay the 
preliminary costs of development.72  Thus, the municipality may access 
general governmental funds, economic development funds, municipal utility 
funds, or federal grant funds to finance the TIF project.  In this case the tax 
increment generated by the project is then used to repay the loan from the 
municipality’s funds.73  Also, “pay as you go” arrangements may be made 
between the city and developer.74  With this type of financing, developers 
obtain their own project financing and pay for development costs.  The city 
then uses tax increments to reimburse the developer for these up-front costs.  
Therefore, the developer bears the risk if the increment is insufficient to repay 
the costs incurred on the project.75 
When utilizing a bond financing scheme or other type of loan arrangement 
in conjunction with TIF, the redevelopment must quickly generate incremental 
taxes large enough to service the principal and interest payments on the bond 
issue or loan.76  However, if the increment is smaller than expected, default is 
generally considered to be the option of last resort.  Prior to taking this step, 
the municipality may either reduce its expenditures in other project areas, or 
utilize intragovernmental grants or other interest income to service the debt.77 
TIF is also flexible in that it allows municipalities to defray a wide variety 
of up-front development costs.  TIF funds may be used to acquire property or 
structures, demolish or remove obsolete structures, install utilities or other 
public site improvements, or construct streets.78  TIF may also be used to pay 
off various miscellaneous costs, such as economic and environmental studies, 
engineering surveys, building plans and specifications and master planning 
documents.79  TIF funds, however, cannot be used to directly finance the 
 
 71. GELFAND & SALSICH, supra note 68, at 143. 
 72. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(8) (Supp. 1998) (defining “obligations” as “bonds, loans, 
debentures, notes, special certificates, or other evidences of indebtedness issued by a municipality 
to carry out a redevelopment project or refund outstanding obligations”). 
 73. See id. 
 74. See MINNEAPOLIS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, What is Tax Increment 
Financing?, at http://www.mcda.org/Org/factsheets/taxincrementfinancing.htm. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Chapman, supra note 7, at 185. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(14) (listing the typical costs associated with TIF).  See 
also NATIONAL BUSINESS INSTITUTE, MAJOR LAND USE LAWS IN MISSOURI 134-35 (1998).  
Mary B. Schultz authored this article. 
 79. Schultz, supra note 78, at 135. 
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private interests of the developer (i.e., by allowing the developer to purchase 
equipment, or by contributing to his profit).80 
As noted earlier, TIF traditionally acted to “freeze” only the property taxes 
within the TIF district.  However, under the Missouri statute, fifty percent of 
any new local Economic Activity Taxes (EATS), such as local sales taxes, 
earnings taxes, or utility taxes generated from the project may also be paid into 
the Special Allocation Fund.81  This greatly expands the uses of TIF, especially 
for commercial retail projects such as shopping malls and strip mall centers, 
which generate significant sales taxes.  TIF projects located within an 
Enterprise Zone, Federal Empowerment Zone or the Central Business District 
may also tap fifty percent of the “new state revenue” generated by the 
project.82 
B. Procedural Requirements of the TIF-Enabling Statute 
Under Missouri’s Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment 
Act, municipalities are subject to a host of procedural requirements that must 
be met prior to enacting a TIF project.  These requirements create a procedural 
mechanism for municipalities to follow in enacting TIF plans and serve as a 
safeguard against the misuse of TIF. 
1. The Redevelopment Plan 
Generally, the authorization of a TIF redevelopment project begins with 
the municipality commissioning urban planning experts to prepare a written 
Redevelopment Plan.83  The Redevelopment Plan must set forth numerous 
details of the project, including its objectives, estimated costs, anticipated 
sources of funding, evidence of financial commitments acquired, anticipated 
type and terms of the bond obligations to be issued by the municipality or 
development authority, and the most recent EAV of the property and estimates 
of the incremental taxes which are expected to be generated.84  The 
Redevelopment Plan must also contain a cost-benefit analysis illustrating the 
economic impact of the plan on affected taxing jurisdictions, the impact on the 
municipal economy if the plan is not undertaken and “sufficient information 
 
 80. See CASELLA, supra note 9, at 5. 
 81. St. Louis Development Corp., Tax Benefit Programs: Tax Increment Financing (TIF), at 
http://stlouis.missouri.org/sldc/busdev/tif.html.  See also MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(4). 
 82. St. Louis Development Corp., supra note 81.  This applies to TIF projects initiated after 
January 1, 1998.  Id. 
 83. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810.1. 
 84. Id. The Redevelopment Plan must also include findings that the “blighting” and “but for” 
tests, described infra in text accompanying notes 112-117, are met.  Furthermore, the 
Redevelopment Plan must “confor[m] to the comprehensive plan for the development of the 
municipality as a whole.”  Id. §99.810(2). 
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from the developer . . . to evaluate whether the project proposed is financially 
feasible.”85 
2. The TIF Commission 
In conjunction with the Redevelopment Plan, the municipality is required 
to establish a TIF Commission consisting of nine, eleven or twelve persons.86  
Appointments to the TIF Commission are made by the chief elected officer of 
the municipality, the school boards, the other affected taxing districts, and, at 
times, the county in which the TIF district is located.87  Specifically, the chief 
elected officer of the municipality appoints six members of the TIF 
Commission, subject to the consent of the majority of the municipality’s 
governing board.88  The affected school board appoints two members to the 
TIF Commission, and the other affected taxing jurisdictions appoint one 
member.89  The county appoints three members to the TIF commission where a 
twelve-person TIF commission is established.90  The members of the TIF 
commission appointed by the municipality serve a fixed term, but the members 
appointed by the school district and other affected taxing jurisdictions may 
either serve a fixed term or a term coinciding with the length of time of the 
redevelopment project.91 
 
 85. Id. § 99.810(5).  The financial analysis should also show “the impact on the economy if 
the project is not built, and is built pursuant to the redevelopment plan under consideration.”  Id. 
 86. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820.2.  Specifically, the statute reads: 
[P]rior to adoption of an ordinance approving the designation of a redevelopment area or 
approving a redevelopment plan or redevelopment project, the municipality shall create a 
commission of nine persons if the municipality is a county or a city not within a county 
and not a first class county with a charter form of government with a population in excess 
of nine hundred thousand, and eleven persons if the municipality is not a county and not 
in a first class county with a charter form of government having a population of more than 
nine hundred thousand, and twelve persons if the municipality is located in or is a first 
class county with a charter form of government having a population of more than nine 
hundred thousand . . . .” 
Id. 
 87. Id. § 99.820.2(1)-(6). 
 88. Id. § 99.820.2(3). 
 89. Id. § 99.820.2(1)-(2).  Where there is an eleven-person TIF commission, the two 
additional appointments are made by the county of the municipality.  Where there is a twelve-
person TIF commission—i.e., a municipality located in a first class county with a charter form of 
government and having a population in excess of nine hundred thousand—the three additional 
appointments are made by the county of the municipality.  Id. § 99.820.2(4)-(6). 
 90. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820.2(6) (Supp. 1998). 
 91. See id. § 99.820.2(7).  Specifically, “of the members first appointed by the municipality, 
two shall be designated to serve for terms of two years, two shall be designated to serve for a term 
of three years and two shall be designated to serve for a term of four years . . . .” Id. 
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The TIF commission is given broad powers to effectuate the 
redevelopment project.92 Generally speaking, the commission will give notice 
regarding the Plan and carry out public hearings related to the Plan.93  Also, 
within thirty days of the public hearings on the Redevelopment Plan, the TIF 
Commission must vote on the Plan and make recommendations to the city’s 
governing body.94  The TIF Commission may also be called on by the 
municipal board periodically to review the status of the redevelopment project 
area.95 
3. Public Hearing Requirements 
The statute requires that the TIF Commission hold public hearings on the 
proposed Redevelopment Plan.96  The TIF notice requirements related to the 
public hearings are fairly strict to ensure that the interested parties and the 
public are made aware of the Redevelopment Plan.  Notice must be given to all 
interested parties by mail or publication.97  Notice by publication must be 
given twice—once within thirty days of the hearing and again within ten 
days.98  Notices must also be sent by certified mail to all persons who paid 
general property taxes on parcels of property within the affected 
redevelopment district.99  The notices must include the following: the meeting 
time and place, the proposed project boundaries, a description of the proposed 
redevelopment, a notice of where the Redevelopment Plan may be viewed, and 
a statement that all parties attending the public hearing will have an 
opportunity to be heard.100  At the hearing, the public is given a chance to 
comment on the proposed plan, voice concerns and give additional 
feedback.101 
4. Municipal Approval and Ordinances 
Within ninety days of the public hearing, and after receiving a 
recommendation from the TIF Commission that the Redevelopment Plan be 
approved, the municipality’s governing board—generally, its board of 
 
 92. See id. § 99.820.3. 
 93. Id. 
 94. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820.3 (Supp. 1998). 
 95. See id. § 99.810.2. 
 96. Id. § 99.830.1. 
 97. Id.  Where notice is given by mail, it must be made by certified mail addressed to “the 
person or persons in whose name the general taxes for the last preceding year were paid on each 
lot, block, tract, or parcel of land lying within the redevelopment project or redevelopment 
area . . . .”  Id. 
 98. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.830.1 (Supp. 1998). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. § 99.830.2(1)-(4). 
 101. Id. § 99.825.1.  Written objections to the plan may be filed, or, alternatively, oral 
comments may be given.  Id. 
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aldermen—must decide whether it will put the Redevelopment Plan into 
effect.102  If the board chooses to do so, it must adopt ordinances approving the 
Redevelopment Plan and designating the redevelopment area.103  After 
approving such ordinances, the municipality is authorized to “[m]ake and enter 
into all contracts necessary or incidental to the implementation and furtherance 
of its redevelopment plan or project.”104  Thereafter, the municipality may 
purchase or lease the subject project, or, alternatively, acquire the property by 
eminent domain.  More commonly, however, the developer will already own 
the property or act to purchase it.105  After the acquisition of the property is 
finalized, the municipality, acting in conjunction with the developer, may 
proceed with the preparation of the property for development.106  By statute, 
the municipality is given the power to use all means “reasonably necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the redevelopment plan.”107 
5. Ongoing Compliance 
Generally speaking, the municipality periodically will review the TIF 
districts under its authority to ensure compliance with state regulations.  
Specifically, the municipality will look to make sure that its bond debt is being 
retired in a timely fashion.  Under the Missouri statute, the TIF bonds must be 
retired within twenty-three years.108  When the debt is fully retired, the tax 
assessments are “unfrozen” and the totality of the incremental tax revenues are 
returned to the traditional taxing jurisdictions.109  Of course, the TIF project, if 
successful, will result in a considerably higher tax base than before the 
redevelopment project began.110 
 
 102. Id. § 99.820.1(1). 
 103. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820.1(1). Also, section 99.830(1) provides that “no redevelopment 
project shall be approved unless a redevelopment plan has been approved and a redevelopment 
area has been designated prior to or concurrently with the approval of such redevelopment 
project . . . .” 
 104. Id. § 99.820.1(2) (Supp. 1998). 
 105. Id. § 99.820.1(3).  Specifically, the municipality may “acquire by purchase, donation, 
lease or eminent domain, own, convey, lease, mortgage, or dispose of, land or other property, real 
or personal, or rights or interests therein, and grant or acquire licenses, easements and options 
with respect thereto . . .”  Id. 
 106. Id. § 99.820(4). 
 107. Id. § 99.820(3).  In fact, TIF often goes hand in hand with eminent domain.  See Rogers, 
supra note 32, at 167. 
 108. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810(3).  However, in certain circumstances the debt can be 
refinanced and the length of the project extended.  Chapman, supra note 7, at 184. 
 109. Chapman, supra note 7, at 184. 
 110. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN MISSOURI 1033 
C. Substantive Requirements of the TIF-Enabling Statute 
In contrast to the host of procedural requirements that must be satisfied for 
a municipality to use TIF, the enabling statute requires only two substantive 
tests to be met.111  Specifically, the statute calls for the municipality to issue 
findings in its Redevelopment Plan that the proposed redevelopment has met 
the requirements of the blighting test and the but-for test.  The requirements of 
each test will be examined in turn. 
1. The Blighting Test 
A common misunderstanding of TIF is that it can only be used in 
conjunction with “blighted” properties.  In fact, to meet the requirements of the 
so-called blighting test, the municipality must issue findings in its 
Redevelopment Plan that “the redevelopment area on the whole is either a 
‘blighted area,’ a ‘conservation area,’ or an ‘economic development area.’”112 
A blighted area is defined by the statute as any area: 
By reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, 
unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site improvements, improper 
subdivision or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions which endanger 
life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such factors, 
retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or 
social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its 
present condition and use.113 
A conservation area, on the other hand, is defined as any area: 
[I]n which fifty percent or more of the structures in the area have an age of 
thirty-five years or more.  Such an area is not yet a blighted area but is 
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare and may become a 
blighted area because of any one or more of the following factors: dilapidation; 
obsolescence; deterioration; illegal use of individual structures; presence of 
structures below minimum code standards; abandonment; excessive vacancies; 
overcrowding of structures and community facilities; lack of ventilation, light 
or sanitary facilities; inadequate utilities; excessive land coverage; deleterious 
land use or layout; depreciation of physical maintenance; and lack of 
community planning.114 
 
 111. The distinction between “procedural tests” and “substantive tests” within TIF’s enabling 
statute is this author’s interpretation of the statute.  The statute itself does not break the 
requirements into these terms. 
 112. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810.1(1). 
 113. Id. § 99.805(1). 
 114. Id. § 99.805(3) (Supp. 1998).  A conservation area “shall meet at least three of the 
factors provided in this subdivision for projects approved on or after December 23, 1997.” Id. 
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Finally, an economic development area is defined as an area that is neither 
a blighted area nor a conservation area, but where the municipality finds 
redevelopment to be in the public interest, because the redevelopment will: 
(a) Discourage commerce, industry, or manufacturing from moving their 
operations to another state; or 
(b)  Result in increased employment in the municipality; or 
(c) Result in preservation or enhancement of the tax base of the 
municipality.115 
In order to establish an Economic Development Area, a municipality must also 
find that the subject property “will not be solely used for development of 
commercial businesses which unfairly compete in the local economy.”116 
2. The But-For Test 
The municipality, along with declaring the property as either a blighted 
area, conservation area, or economic development area, must also issue 
findings that “[t]he redevelopment area on the whole . . . has not been subject 
to growth and development through investment by private enterprise and 
would not reasonably be anticipated to be developed without the adoption of 
[the redevelopment plan].”117  This requirement is known generally as the but-
for test (i.e., the property would not be developed but-for the tax increment 
financing).  The but-for test is a matter for both the developer and the 
municipality to consider, and the financial documents contained in the 
Redevelopment Plan should indicate the municipality’s but- for findings.118 
IV.   PROS AND CONS OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
TIF, as with most other business incentives, has both advantages and 
disadvantages, depending upon the manner in which it is used.  In its present 
form, TIF mostly appeals to municipal government and development interests.  
On the other hand, TIF is mainly criticized by economic and social policy 
groups, as well as residents in communities using TIF, who question whether 
or not TIF is necessary to spur additional development.  The arguments both 
for and against TIF will be presented in this section. 
 
 115. Id. § 99.805(5) (Supp. 1998). 
 116. Id. 
 117. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810(1). 
 118. Id.  § 99.810(1) (Supp. 1998). 
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A. Advantages of Tax Increment Financing 
1. Property “Recycling” 
TIF allows for redevelopment of “problem” property tending toward decay 
and obsolescence.119  The costs associated with redeveloping or rehabilitating 
such property are generally greater than developing “green space,” due to the 
demolition costs, environmental remediation expenses, and the need for 
additional infrastructure associated with such projects.120  By subsidizing 
development in areas of aging infrastructure, TIF provides a mechanism to 
“level the playing field” through its simple yet powerful fiscal bootstrapping 
technique.121  Moreover, this “recycling” of infrastructure and property, if 
successful, also leads to beneficial secondary effects, such as the creation of 
job opportunities and the enhancement of neighborhood sustainability, as well 
as ultimately enhancing the municipality’s tax base, pending the retirement of 
its bond obligations.122  Furthermore, such redevelopment will often stimulate 
other nearby property development.123  Not surprisingly, municipalities often 
cite these secondary effects as factors justifying the use of TIF.124 
2. Read My Lips: “No New Taxes” 
In Missouri and other states, TIF provides a means of funding real estate 
development projects without raising general taxes.  Unlike other general tax 
levies, with TIF, there is no need for the municipality to levy additional taxes 
or request a public referendum on the use of TIF funds in conjunction with the 
proposed redevelopment project.  Instead, in place of taxes, the developer 
makes payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs).125  This is not the case in several 
other states, which subject TIF to the general restrictions imposed on tax 
levies.126 
 
 119. CULOTTA, supra note 11, at 5. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
 122. MINNEAPOLIS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, supra note 74. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Peddle, supra note 59, at 447. 
 125. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.835(1).  The issue of whether PILOTs are actually taxes was 
litigated in Tax Increment Fin. Comm’n of Kan. City v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d 70 
(Mo. 1989).  Dunn argued in part that PILOTs are taxes and that article X, section 22(a) of the 
Missouri Constitution “requires increases in government revenues and expenditures to be 
approved by a vote of the people affected by the increase.”  Id. at 74 (emphasis added).  The 
Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that “[t]he Constitution does not prohibit 
a city from levying an existing tax without voter approval; instead, it prohibits a city from 
increasing the current levy of an existing tax without voter approval.”  Id. 
 126. Iowa, Arizona, South Dakota, Kentucky and Wisconsin have held that tax increment 
financing is subject to constitutional debt limitations, thereby, at least in part subjecting TIF to 
voter approval.  See Goshorn, supra note 32, at 938-39. 
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3. Strong Local Control 
TIF allows for strong local control.127  While TIF is authorized by state 
statute, the decision-making power with respect to TIF is in the hands of 
individual municipalities.128  Municipalities may initiate the TIF project and 
solicit developer proposals.  Alternatively, developers may approach 
municipalities with a project suitable for TIF.  In either case, municipalities 
maintain the authority to examine the financial merits of each proposed 
project, define the extent of the TIF, and oversee the developer’s efforts.129 
4. Flexibility 
TIF also has built-in flexibility.  It allows for reimbursement of a wide 
range of costs of development.130  As noted earlier, TIF funds may be used for 
the acquisition of land; demolition and removal of blighted structures; 
installation, construction or reconstruction of streets, utilities or other site 
improvements; restoration of properties of historic or architectural value; and 
for the payment of miscellaneous costs.131  TIF employs several types of 
financing schemes, including bond debt and pay-as-you-go arrangements.132  
TIF may be initiated anytime a development opportunity arises.  Also, TIF 
may be used on both commercial and residential projects.  Such flexibility 
makes TIF highly attractive to developers engaged in a wide range of projects. 
5. Positive Fiscal Impacts 
Finally, municipalities point to studies stating that TIF’s fiscal 
bootstrapping technique is successful in raising assessed property values and 
creating successful projects.  For instance, a 1997 St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
study found that TIF-subsidized projects almost always enlarge a city’s tax 
base in the long run, with the assessed value of the TIF districts in Missouri 
appreciating an average of seventy-five percent after the implementation and 
completion of the TIF plan.133  However, recent data studies have reached 
contradictory conclusions as to the value of TIF as an economic development 
tool.  For instance, one recent study by economists Richard F. Dye and David 
 
 127. See 1998 PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 57, at 5. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See, e.g., MID-AMERICA REGIONAL COUNCIL, LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
INCENTIVES: KANSAS CITY METROPOLITAN AREA 3 (1996) (on file with the Saint Louis 
University Law Journal). 
 130. 2000 PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 55, at 5. 
 131. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
 132. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text. 
 133. Mihalopoulos, supra note 53.  The Post-Dispatch study noted that as of April, 1997, 
nearly $1 billion in private investment had accompanied $250 million in TIF-financed projects in 
the St. Louis metro area.  Id. 
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F. Merriman showed that TIF ultimately produced a negative growth rate for 
assessed property values.134 
B. Disadvantages of Tax Increment Financing 
Regardless of the ultimate financial impacts, TIF is not universally lauded.  
Taxing jurisdictions and public advocacy groups often oppose TIF as an 
unnecessary “giveaway” to developers.  Opponents also allege that TIF results 
in substantial losses to traditional taxing jurisdictions, displacement of existing 
businesses and residents, inefficient use of public resources, and “revenue-
shifting” that undermines the health of the regional economy. 
1. Inefficient Allocation of Resources 
The primary argument against TIF is that it may result in inefficient 
allocation of scarce resources.135  This is most apparent where the development 
would have occurred without the subsidy.  In other words, if the developer 
obtained an excessive TIF subsidy, the taxing jurisdictions are wrongfully 
deprived of the incremental revenue, and the developer excessively benefits 
because the public ultimately absorbs the additional costs.136  When this 
happens, TIF represents an inefficient use of market resources and may prevent 
the dedication of such resources to other deserving projects. 
2. Effects on Traditional Taxing Jurisdictions 
Critics also contend that traditional taxing jurisdictions often lose 
substantial incremental property revenues to TIF, especially when multiple 
large redevelopment projects are authorized within a single municipality.137  
Studies have noted that large-scale TIF projects result in very long-term and 
intensive tax commitments.138  Missouri, however, largely mitigates this TIF 
danger by providing the school district with a voice on any TIF commission.139  
Other states have vested taxing jurisdictions with even more power, by 
 
 134. Richard F. Dye & David F. Merriman, The Effects of Tax Increment Financing on 
Economic Development, 47 J. URB. ECON. 306, 307 (2000). 
 135. For a fuller exposition of this view, see Kenneth P. Thomas, Editorial, When Tax Help 
Goes To Those Not In Need, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 1998, at B3.  Professor 
Thomas argues that economic efficiency is not served by TIF, or by other economic incentives.  
Id. 
 136. Chapman, supra note 7, at 188. 
 137. WILCOX & VERSEL, supra note 38, at 16. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.  By giving school boards and other 
affected taxing jurisdictions representation on TIF commissions, the state provides a check on the 
municipality.  The affected taxing jurisdictions may voice their opinion as to the effects of the 
TIF and ultimately vote on whether or not the TIF should be approved. 
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allowing them to independently negotiate with the municipality in the 
increment determination process.140 
3. Inter-municipal Bidding and Revenue-Shifting 
Critics of TIF also argue that TIF encourages disadvantageous inter-
municipality bidding wars for development dollars.141  These bidding wars, if 
unchecked, can lead to adverse revenue-shifting effects that undermine the 
health of the larger regional economy.142  Such inter-municipality bidding on 
new development does not generate new wealth on its own, but shifts wealth 
from one outlet to another.143  Concededly, revenue-shifting occurs to some 
extent whenever a new provider enters the market.  However, the effects of 
revenue-shifting may be exacerbated by the use of subsidies such as TIF.144 
The ultimate problem posed by this revenue-shifting effect is that, as one 
commentator pointed out, TIF is not a “perpetual motion machine.”145 In other 
words, TIF cannot sustain itself indefinitely.  Each TIF project is ultimately not 
“self-financing” because it relies on the larger economic marketplace to 
generate the additional incremental tax revenue.  Thus, TIF, if used sparingly 
and judiciously, will increase property values and generate enough increment 
to finance its own projects.  However, if TIF is overused, the community will 
experience diminishing marginal returns from its TIF-backed 
redevelopment.146  Such diminishing returns will lead to two possible 
outcomes.  First, the diminishing returns may lead to a decline in the projected 
increment, forcing smaller projects or cancellation of TIF projects.  Second, 
municipalities may overestimate the projected increment and then be forced to 
default on their bond obligations when the increment is insufficient to cover 
their bond debt.147 
 
 140. WILCOX & VERSEL, supra note 38, at 17.  Other states, such as Kansas, are considering 
whether to allow school districts the right to receive both present and future tax increments from 
the proposed development, effectively removing the school district from the TIF equation.  Id. 
 141. See Merrill Goozner, Governments Rethink Corporate Tax Breaks, CHI. TRIB., March 
14, 2000, at http://www.chicago.tribune.com/news/printedition/article/0,2669,SAV-
0003140318,FF.html. 
 142. See Editorial, TIF Reform and Regional Growth, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, April 3, 
2000, which states: “In our area, TIFs have done more harm than good.  Instead of revitalizing 
declining areas, they have hastened their decline by redirecting capital to richer areas.” Id. 
 143. 2000 PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 55, at 5. 
 144. See Peddle, supra note 59, at 444. 
 145. Chapman, supra note 7, at 185. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 188.  Certain states have acted to limit such “competitive retail outlet hunting.”  
For instance, some states require the municipality to independently negotiate with the school 
districts regarding the amount of the increment devoted to the redevelopment. Other states now 
limit the amount of vacant land that can be included in a redevelopment project area.  See 
WILCOX & VERSEL, supra note 38, at 9. 
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V.  THE MISSOURI COURTS’ ACCEPTANCE OF THE BLIGHTING STANDARD 
While TIF obviously has both strengths and weaknesses, it will almost 
undoubtedly continue to be used by municipalities on a wide range of 
development projects.  This trend has been accepted by the Missouri courts, 
which have consistently and uniformly held that Missouri’s TIF statute is 
constitutional as written, and that the blighting and but-for tests are valid 
restraints upon the municipal exercise of power.148  This trend recently reached 
its zenith in JG St. Louis West L.L.C. v. City of Des Peres.  However, prior 
decisions, including decisions predating Missouri’s adoption of TIF, laid the 
foundation for the court’s decision in JG St. Louis West.  Thus, this section 
provides a look at the most significant decisions in Missouri involving 
municipal determinations of blight and but-for, starting with Tierney v. 
Planned Industrial Expansion Authority of Kansas City and culminating with 
JG St. Louis West.149 
A. Tierney v. Planned Industrial Expansion Authority of Kansas City150 
1. Historical Facts 
In 1967 Missouri adopted section 100.310 of the Missouri Revised 
Statutes, also known as the Planned Industrial Expansion Act, which allows 
municipalities to acquire and redevelop land in “blighted,” “insanitary” or 
“undeveloped” areas.151  The section 100.310 provisions are in many respects 
substantially similar to TIF.152  Under the powers conferred by section 
100.310, the Planned Industrial Expansion Authority of Kansas City (PIEA), 
sought to redevelop a twenty-two acre parcel of land in downtown Kansas 
City.153  PIEA declared the parcel to be of a “blighted, insanitary or 
undeveloped” condition and instituted condemnation proceedings to acquire 
the land.154  The Tierneys, owners of a “structurally sound and useable” 
property within the larger blighted parcel, opposed PIEA’s condemnation 
proceedings on the grounds that their property did not fall into any of the three 
statutory categories (blighted, insanitary or undeveloped).155  The Tierneys also 
 
 148. See infra notes 150-212 and accompanying text. 
 149. It should be noted that several of these cases do not directly involve TIF, but other 
redevelopment statutes enacted in Missouri.  However, these decisions are important in that they 
involve determinations of “blight” and influence the court’s view of TIF in later cases such as JG 
St. Louis West v. City of Des Peres. 
 150. 742 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). 
 151. Tierney v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of Kan. City, 742 S.W.2d 146, 148-49. 
 152. See MO. REV. STAT. § 100.310 (1994). 
 153. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 149.  Tierney’s property formed only a small part of a larger 
“blighted” tract.  Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 151. 
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objected to the municipality’s use of “economic underutilization” as a rationale 
for its finding of blight.156  The Tierneys suggested that the court’s acceptance 
of the concept of “economic underutilization” as a legitimate rationale for 
redevelopment would result in municipalities acquiring virtually “unlimited 
discretion” to determine where to pursue redevelopment.157 
2. Holding 
The court noted that the Tierneys were not challenging the “basic concepts 
underlying urban redevelopment,” but rather the application of section 100.310 
to their “structurally sound and useable” property.158  Under this “as applied” 
challenge to the municipal findings, the court accorded deference to the 
legislative determinations of blight.159  Indeed, the court stated that, unless the 
municipality’s decision was of an arbitrary or unreasonable nature, 
determining “whether a particular area is blighted . . . is a matter for the 
legislative body to resolve.”160  Moreover, the court held that “economic 
underutilization” was a reasonable basis for a municipality to issue findings of 
blight.161  The court stated that “[t]he concept of urban redevelopment has gone 
far beyond slum clearance and the concept of economic underutilization is a 
valid one.”162  Thus, the court would not sit as a “court of appeal over the 
decision made by the municipal board,” but the “burden is on the owners to 
show that the finding of blight constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable abuse of 
the legislative authority.”163  The Tierneys failed to meet this burden.164 
B. Crestwood Commons Redevelopment Corp. v. 66 Drive-In165 
1. Historical Facts 
The Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals again considered the 
extent of a municipality’s power to issue findings of blight in Crestwood 
Commons Redevelopment Corp. v. 66 Drive-In.166 The case involved the 
 
 156. Id.  Apparently, either in issuing the findings of blight or in prior conversations with the 
plaintiff-owner, the municipality stated that the land was “economically underutilized” and 
sought to use this as a basis for condemnation, although this was not specifically stated in the 
opinion.  Id. 
 157. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 151. 
 158. Id. at 150. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 151. 
 162. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 151. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. 812 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
 166. Id. 
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redevelopment of the 66 Drive-In movie theater into what was to be a 
Schnuck’s supercenter grocery store.167 The Crestwood Board of Aldermen 
determined that the 66 Drive-In site would be the ideal, if not the only, site 
within the municipality that could accommodate the new store.168  The City, 
acting under section 353, which, like TIF, requires a finding of blight, 
therefore sought to condemn the Drive-In’s property.169  The City 
commissioned studies finding that the property had “building, structures, and 
land uses which, because of age, obsolescence, inadequate or outmoded 
design, or physical deterioration have resulted in economic and social liability 
to the City and its residents . . . and may be found to be a blighted area.”170 The 
Drive-In, however, desired to redevelop the property itself, and thus opposed 
the condemnation and redevelopment under section 353.171  The City issued a 
finding of blight and ultimately petitioned for condemnation of the Drive-In’s 
property, despite 66 Drive-In’s opposition to the project.172 
2. Holding 
The circuit court determined that Crestwood’s decision to declare the 
Drive-In blighted was arbitrary and issued an injunction to stop the 
condemnation proceedings.  On appeal, however, the decision of the lower 
court was reversed.173  As in Tierney, the court found that Crestwood, in 
issuing its findings of blight, had acted in its “legislative capacity” and thus the 
standard of judicial review was limited to whether the legislative determination 
was “arbitrary” or induced by “fraud, collusion or bad faith.”174  Therefore, the 
court accorded the City wide discretion in the “exercise of judgment in 
determining a condition of blight in a given area.”175  Furthermore, the court 
stated that it “could not substitute its opinion for that of the board unless it 
appeared the board’s conclusion was clearly ‘arbitrary.’”176  In this case, 
 
 167. Id. at 905. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id.  MO. REV. STAT. § 353.020(2) states: “[B]lighted area shall mean that portion of the 
city within which the legislative authority of such city determines that by reason of age, 
obsolescence, inadequate or outmoded design or physical deterioration, have become economic 
and social liabilities, and that such conditions are conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, 
crime or inability to pay reasonable taxes.” 
 170. Crestwood Commons, 812 S.W.2d at 905.  Moreover, these conditions were such as to 
be “conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, crime or inability to pay reasonable taxes.”  
Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 906-07. 
 173. Id. at 908. 
 174. Id. at 909. 
 175. Crestwood Commons, 812 S.W.2d at 909. 
 176. Id.  Specifically, the court states that “there was room for reasonable differences and fair 
debate on this issue. From the evidence, the Board reasonably could have concluded both that the 
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because the evidence neither compelled a finding of “blight” nor did it compel 
a conclusion to the contrary, the court held that the board reasonably could 
have concluded that the area was blighted and in need of redevelopment.  
Therefore, the Board’s decision was permitted to stand.177 
C. Tax Increment Financing Commission of Kansas City v. J.E. Dunn 
Construction Co.178 
1. Historical Facts 
In 1986, Kansas City designated a 57,000 square foot parcel of property as 
a “conservation area” under Missouri’s TIF statute.179  The City’s 
Redevelopment Plan called for the rehabilitation of two existing buildings and 
the construction of a new building for office and warehouse space.180  Dunn, 
the owner of a useable 7500 square foot parcel of land within the 
redevelopment project area, rejected the city’s initial buyout offer.181  
Subsequently the city filed a petition to condemn the property under its power 
of eminent domain.182  After the trial court ordered Dunn’s property 
condemned, three condemnation commissioners awarded $55,000 to Dunn.183  
Subsequently Dunn filed a motion to dismiss. 
Dunn did not allege that the City Council had acted in an arbitrary or 
fraudulent manner in finding that the property was a conservation area, but 
rather Dunn challenged the constitutionality of the Real Property Tax 
Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act.184  One argument Dunn raised was 
 
area was blighted within the meaning of Section 353.020 and that a redevelopment plan was 
necessary.”  Id. 
 177. Id. (emphasis added). 
 178. 781 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1989) (en banc). 
 179. Tax Increment Fin. Comm’n of Kan. City v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d 70, 74-
78 (Mo. 1989) (en banc). 
 180. Id. at 74. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d at 74.  While Dunn argued that TIF was 
unconstitutional, or more specifically, that TIF’s authorization of the redevelopment of 
“conservation areas” was unconstitutional, this was not his main argument.  Dunn’s primary 
argument, which lies outside the scope of this Note, was that PILOTs, the incremental funds paid 
by the property owners into the Special Allocation Fund, were taxes, and that the Missouri 
Constitution requires such taxes to be approved by a vote of the people affected by the increase.  
Id.  The court rejected this argument, stating: “PILOTs are special assessments levied against the 
property in the District for the improvements provided that property under a redevelopment plan.”  
Id. at 77.  In labeling the PILOTs as “special assessments” rather than new taxes, the bond 
indebtedness did not violate the constitutional requirements.  Id.  This issue, as to whether 
PILOTs are taxes, has already been addressed by other authors.  See Goshorn, supra note 32, at 
938.  Goshorn questions the formalistic distinction made by the court between “special 
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that the Missouri Constitution did not expressly allow for a municipality to 
designate land as a “conservation area” under the TIF statute.  Dunn argued 
primarily from article VI, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution, which 
provides that “laws may be enacted, and any city or county . . . may enact 
ordinances . . . providing for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction, 
redevelopment, and rehabilitation of blighted, substandard or insantarity 
areas . . . and for the taking . . . by eminent domain, of property for such 
purchases.”185  Noting that the constitution never expressly mentioned the 
phrase “conservation area” as a legitimate area that could be found blighted, 
Dunn contended that the powers of eminent domain did not apply to the taking 
of property within such a designated area.186 
2. Holding 
The court rejected Dunn’s constitutional interpretation argument.187  
Rather, the court stated that the term “substandard,” as used in the constitution, 
“speaks to a power given certain political subdivisions to prevent, as well as 
eliminate, incipient conditions of blight.”188  Therefore, conservation areas, 
which are areas “not yet blighted” but “detrimental to the public health, safety, 
morals, or welfare” could be legitimately categorized as “substandard” under 
the constitution, and the designation of Dunn’s land as a “conservation area” 
under the statute would not be deemed unconstitutional.189 
D. City of St. Charles v. DeVault Management190 
1. Historical Facts 
In 1993, the City of St. Charles, Missouri, attempted to establish a TIF 
district for the redevelopment of 106 acres within its city limits.191  St. Charles 
declared the area to be of a “blighted” condition.192  DeVault owned 
apartments occupying eleven acres within the Redevelopment Plan 
boundaries.193  When St. Charles instituted condemnation proceedings to 
acquire possession of the property, DeVault Management and its owners 
 
assessments” as opposed to “taxes” and has been questioned by various commentators.  
Moreover, several other states, including Iowa and Wisconsin, have held that debt generated from 
TIF is subject to constitutional debt limits.  Id. 
 185. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d at 78. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (emphasis added). 
 189. Id. 
 190. 959 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 191. City of St. Charles v. DeVault Mgmt., 959 S.W.2d. 815, 818 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 817-18. 
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sought to dismiss the suit, alleging that St. Charles failed to plead sufficient 
facts for eminent domain, to inform defendant of all relevant hearings, and to 
adopt proper ordinances.194  DeVault’s primary contention was that the city’s 
Redevelopment Plan, which called for the development of a hotel and 
entertainment area, was not in conformity with its comprehensive plan, which 
called for park land and moderate density residential use in the area of the 
subject property.195 
2. Holding 
In this case the court stated that St. Charles, as plaintiff seeking 
condemnation of the DeVault property, bore the initial burden of proof of 
showing compliance with the TIF statute.196  The court found that the city 
failed to carry its burden of proof as it failed to prove that the Redevelopment 
Plan “conforms to the comprehensive plan for the development of the 
municipality as a whole” as required under section 99.810(2).197  The lack of 
conformity, which was neither doubtful nor even fairly debatable, was thus 
“arbitrary, contrary to fact, and an unwarranted abuse of discretion.”198  City of 
St. Charles v. DeVault Management, therefore, provides some illumination of 
what is required to prove that a municipality acted in an “arbitrary” manner in 
making its determination of blight. 
E. JG St. Louis West L.L.C. v. City of Des Peres199 
1. Historical Facts 
As was previously discussed, in 1997, Westfield America, hoping to attract 
a Nordstrom’s department store to one of its Shoppingtowns, asked the City of 
Des Peres to consider redeveloping West County Center with TIF funds.200  
Des Peres agreed to negotiate with Westfield for the TIF funds, and over the 
next two years undertook the requisite initial procedural steps of establishing a 
TIF commission and hiring planning consultants to do preliminary financial 
 
 194. Id. at 818.  Plaintiffs also contended lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal 
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for relief. Id. 
 195. DeVault Mgmt, 959 S.W.2d at 820.  A city’s “comprehensive plan” is distinguished from 
a “redevelopment plan.”  The purpose of a comprehensive plan is to “guide the development and 
use of land within the city.”  Id. at 822. 
 196. Id. at 820. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. No. ED77037, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2001). 
 200. JG St. Louis West L.L.C. v. City of Des Peres, No. ED77037, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, 
at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2001).  See supra notes 1-28 and accompanying text for additional 
background. 
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analysis on West County Center.201  These consultants concluded that West 
County Center could be declared blighted and met the but-for test.202 
The West County Center Redevelopment Plan set forth five blighting 
factors of the mall.  First, the Plan stated that the shopping mall suffered from 
“obsolete platting” due to its two-anchor configuration and limited amount of 
space for small retail shops.203  Second, the mall was hindered by “improper 
subdivision” due to irregularly platted lots constraining the ability of the mall 
to grow.204  Third, “deteriorated site conditions” existed in the roof, utility 
system and parapet wall.205  Fourth, deterioration of the mall’s water line could 
potentially endanger mall property if there was a water main break during a 
fire.206  Finally, the Plan found that the mall was an “economic liability” due to 
the fact that the mall was experiencing declining sales and that the mall was 
not keeping its value relative to neighboring, similarly situated, similarly-used 
properties.207  Based on these findings, the Board unanimously passed four 
ordinances which approved and adopted the Redevelopment Plan, authorized a 
bond issue in the amount of $29.8 million, approved a site plan for the West 
County Center redevelopment, and authorized Des Peres to enter into a 
development agreement with Westfield.208  JG St. Louis West L.L.C., the 
owner of a rival shopping mall in St. Louis, in conjunction with several 
residents of Des Peres, filed suit against the city seeking to enjoin the use of 
TIF on the project, and also seeking declaratory judgment invalidating the four 
TIF ordinances.209 
2. Holding 
Adapting the earlier tests of Tierney and Crestwood Commons 
Redevelopment Corp., the court found that the Des Peres Board of Alderman 
had the power to declare the mall blighted so long as there was no showing that 
they acted in an arbitrary or fraudulent manner in making that decision.210  
Absent such evidence of fraud, the court would not challenge the 
municipality’s “fairly debatable” determination that the mall was blighted.211  
Moreover, the court held that plaintiffs also failed to produce evidence that the 
mall could be redeveloped without the use of TIF; therefore, plaintiffs also 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at *7. 
 204. Id. 
 205. JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *7. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at *3. 
 209. Id. 
 210. JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *8. 
 211. Id. 
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failed to carry their burden in regards to the municipality’s application of the 
but-for test.212 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Principles of Statutory Construction 
Missouri courts apply generally accepted principles of statutory 
construction.213  Thus, when interpreting a statute, Missouri courts determine 
the intent of the statute from the language of the statute itself, as far as is 
possible.214  Indeed, the words considered are given their “plain and ordinary 
meaning” unless they conflict with a “ascertained legislative intent.”215  Where 
a statute is ambiguous, the court will “attempt to construe it in a manner 
consistent with the legislative intent, giving meaning to the words used within 
the broad context of the legislature’s purpose in enacting the law.”216  These 
principles of statutory construction have dictated the court’s expansive 
interpretation of blight in Missouri’s Real Property Tax Increment Allocation 
Redevelopment Act. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, blight has multiple 
definitions.217  Most generally, blight is considered to be “any malignant 
influence of obscure or mysterious origin; anything which withers hope or 
prospects, or checks prosperity.”218  In its verb form, blighting can mean “to 
exert a baleful influence on” or “to destroy the brightness, beauty, or promise 
of,” or even “to nip in the bud, mar, [or] frustrate.”219 
In relation to cities, however, blight takes on somewhat different 
connotations.  Most generally, blight could be described as any “unaesthetic or 
uneconomic section; an area of such kind that razing all the buildings will 
serve a public purpose, even though a few of them may not be substandard or 
blighted.”220  More specifically, blighted areas are those “marked by 
 
 212. Id. at *13. 
 213. See Sullivan v. Carlisle, 851 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. 1993). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 919 (2d ed. 1961). 
 218. Id.  Blight, in relation to plants, is defined as “any baleful influence of atmospheric or 
invisible origin, that suddenly blasts, nips, or destroys plants, affects them with disease, arrests 
their growth, or prevents their blossom from ‘setting’; a diseased state of plants of unknown or 
assumed atmospheric origin.”  Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, What Constitutes a “Blighted Area” Within Urban 
Renewal and Redevelopment Statutes, 45 A.L.R. 3d 1096 (1972). 
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termination of healthy growth and development accompanied by deterioration 
and decline of property values.”221 
While incorporating elements of these definitions, Missouri’s Real 
Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act does not define blight 
in these specific terms.  Rather, the statute identifies blight as “an economic or 
social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its 
present condition and use.”222  Several “factors” are identified to indicate the 
existence of this “economic or social liability,” including: (1) defective or 
inadequate street layout, (2) unsanitary or unsafe conditions, (3) deterioration 
of site improvements, (4) improper subdivision or obsolete platting, (5) the 
existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire or other causes, 
or (6) any “combination of such factors.”223 
Once a municipality makes the determination that the subject property is 
blighted (i.e., that the property suffers from “obsolete platting,” “improper 
subdivision,” “deteriorated site conditions” or the like) the Missouri courts, 
constrained by the rules of statutory construction, must abide by that municipal 
determination so long as there is at least some evidence that the blighting 
factors exist.  In other words, so long as there is a modicum of evidence of 
improper subdivision or obsolete platting or any of the other blighting factors, 
the court will not question the fairly debatable determination made by the 
municipality.224  Any evidence of high surrounding poverty rate, or crime 
rates, or abandoned structure, while not necessary to establish blight, will help 
cement the municipality’s blighting declaration.225 
The end result is that Missouri municipalities are afforded a presumption 
of validity in making their determinations of blight, so long as they have some 
evidence of blight as dictated by the statute’s list of blighting factors.226  
 
 221. Id. 
 222. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(1) (Supp. 1998). 
 223. Id. at § 99.805(3).  Similarly, to be declared a “conservation area,” some combination of 
the following factors must be in existence: 1) deterioration; 2) illegal use of individual structures; 
3) presence of structures below minimum code standards; 4) abandonment; 5) excessive 
vacancies; 6) overcrowding of structures and community facilities; 7) lack of ventilation, light or 
sanitary facilities; 8) inadequate utilities; 9) excessive land coverage; 10) deleterious land use or 
layout; 11) depreciation of physical maintenance; 12) the lack of community planning.  Id. at § 
99.805(3).  Logically, municipalities seeking to utilize TIF rely on this very statutory language in 
making their determinations of blight.  For instance, in the West County Center situation, Des 
Peres determined that the mall was blighted due to “obsolete platting,” “improper subdivision,” 
“deteriorated site conditions,” and the “existence of conditions which could endanger life or 
property.”  See supra notes 203-209 and accompanying text. 
 224. One author, having reviewed “probably fifty TIF qualification studies,” stated that he 
“had yet to see more than a perfunctory treatment of the blighting factors and but-for criterion.” 
Peddle, supra note 59, at 449. 
 225. See Peddle, supra note 59, at 448. 
 226. See JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *11. 
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Obsolete platting, deterioration of infrastructure, declining sales figures, 
declining property values, increasing maintenance costs—the existence of any 
combination of factors forms evidence sufficient for the municipality to reach 
its conclusion that the subject area is blighted.227  If such evidence is available 
to the municipality, the Board’s decision is deemed “fairly debatable” and the 
court will not scrutinize it, absent a showing of fraud or abuse.228 
Similarly, where municipalities provide at least a modicum of evidence 
that the development would not occur without the subsidy, Missouri courts will 
not interfere with the municipality’s determination that the but-for test is met.  
Thus, to satisfy the but-for test, the municipality must supply financial analysis 
of the redevelopment project showing a gap between the expected costs of the 
project and the projected value.229  Alternatively, the municipality may also 
show a consistent pattern of previous but unsuccessful redevelopment efforts 
as evidence that the requirement is fulfilled.230  But so long as the municipality 
presents some evidence to justify its findings, its but-for declaration will be 
shielded from judicial scrutiny. 
The main burden placed upon municipalities seeking to meet the blighting 
and but-for test, is thus one of fact-finding and due diligence.231  To be 
afforded the presumption of validity, the municipality must perform studies, 
engage expert urban planners, and complete the requisite financial analysis 
regarding the subject property.  As one author stated: “[F]or a determination of 
blight to survive scrutiny by trial and appellate courts, the determination must 
be supported by substantial evidence directly apposite to the state requirements 
in the relevant statutory definition of blight.”232 
This presumption of validity, however, imposes a high barrier on a plaintiff 
seeking to enjoin a municipality’s decision to use TIF.  Indeed, the plaintiff 
 
 227. Id. at *10.  Of course, it may be the case that all real estate has increasing maintenance 
costs over time, or “tends toward obsolesce.” 
 228. Id. at *9. 
 229. However, some municipalities fail to include financial analysis in their “but-for” 
findings.  One author describes this as the municipality using their “administrative fiat” to meet 
the but-for test.  Peddle, supra note 59, at 449. 
 230. Id. at 444. 
 231. See, e.g., Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case 
Law, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 476 (2000). 
 232. Id.  He also notes that “the quality of the evidence is important” and should consist of 
photographs, records of police, fire, public health, welfare, and taxing agency, and maps of the 
proposed blighted areas.  Id.  Thus, it is apparent why in the West County Center situation, the 
Des Peres Board of Aldermen “consulted a wide variety of independent information sources, 
including field investigations, records from local sources, interviews with local officials, and 
other independent studies.”  JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *8.  Such 
information, served as a mandate for the board’s ultimate findings that the blighting and but-for 
tests were met, and ultimately served to shield the board’s decision from judicial scrutiny in the 
case brought against the city. 
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would have to show that there was some evidence of fraud or misdealing, or 
that the finding of blight is “so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to an 
abuse of the legislative process.”233  In large part this accounts for the 
decisions being decided against plaintiffs challenging a municipal 
determination of blight in TIF and similar non-TIF cases.234  Evidence of fraud 
or misdealing, however, is exceedingly difficult to produce.  Plaintiffs are thus 
left with little recourse when seeking to overturn municipal decisions to use 
TIF. 
B. Policy Issues 
Besides the principles of statutory construction, several policy issues have 
also influenced the stance of the courts towards the blighting and but-for tests 
of Missouri’s TIF statute.  First, the courts recognize that the redevelopment of 
“blighted, substandard, or insanitary” areas serves a public purpose.235  
Secondly, municipal determinations of blight are deemed to be legislative 
findings not in the realm of judicial review.  Finally, the courts believe that the 
municipalities are in the best position to determine what is and is not blight, 
and, moreover, the courts imply that the electoral process serves a proper 
check on municipal government boards making determinations of blight for the 
purpose of TIF redevelopment. 
Missouri courts hold that the redevelopment of “blighted, substandard, or 
insanitary” areas is a public purpose.236  This principle is embodied in the 
Missouri Constitution, which states that “laws may be enacted . . . providing 
for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction, redevelopment, and rehabilitation 
of blighted, substandard, or insanitary areas . . . as may be deemed in the 
public interest.”237  Moreover, a long and unbroken line of cases has also 
supported the conclusion that property redevelopment serves a “public 
purpose.”  As early as 1954, in State ex rel Dalton v. Land Clearance for 
Redevelopment Authority,238 the Missouri Supreme Court stated: “A legislative 
finding . . . that a blighted or insanitary area exists and that the legislative 
agency proposes to take the property therein under the processes of eminent 
domain for the purpose of clearance and improvement . . . as it may deem in 
the public interest will be accepted by the courts as conclusive evidence that 
the contemplated use thereof is public.”239 
 
 233. See Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 150. 
 234. See supra notes 151-212 and accompanying text. 
 235. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 150. 
 236. Id. 
 237. MO. CONST. art. VI, § 21. 
 238. 270 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1954) (en banc). 
 239. State ex rel Dalton v. Land Clearance For Redevelopment Auth. of Kan. City, 270 
S.W.2d 44, 52 (Mo. 1954) (en banc). 
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Second, the courts have long held that decisions made at the local level are 
legislative determinations that generally fall outside of the scope of judicial 
review.  While municipalities do not have “inherent” legislative powers, the 
Missouri General Assembly, which has plenary powers under article III, 
section I of the Missouri Constitution, may grant municipalities certain 
legislative powers, so long as these powers are within constitutional limits.240  
Under Missouri’s Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Act, municipalities 
acquired certain powers to make legislative determinations as to what 
constitutes “blighted property.”241  The court will thus afford deference to such 
municipal “legislative” determinations, to the extent that there is no showing 
that the determination was tainted by fraud or misdealing.242 
Finally, the courts believe that municipalities are in the best position to 
determine what areas within its borders are blighted. In other words, the courts 
recognize the municipal governing boards’ expertise as to matters of municipal 
governance—or at the very least, heightened knowledge—and judges (or 
juries) are ill-equipped to review such judgments.243  Therefore, the court will 
not substitute its authority for the municipality’s unless the municipality’s 
decision is shown to be “arbitrary or induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith or 
whether the board exceeded its powers.”244 
C. Critique and Proposal 
While the court’s decision in JG St. Louis West is supported by long-
standing principles of statutory construction and public policy, the decision 
handed down in JG St. Louis West fails in that it does not take into account 
common-sense notions of blight.  In other words, the court’s semantic 
manipulation of the term “blight” ignores an underlying reality that many of 
the controversial TIF projects in Missouri are not, by common-sense standards, 
blighted.  Thus, the TIF blighting test is made at best illogical and at worse 
meaningless by the court’s statutory construction of the term. 
Similarly, the but-for standard has proven to be more elusive than helpful. 
Commentators have often pointed out that it is nearly impossible to predict 
 
 240. See City of Kansas City v. Hon, 972 S.W.2d 407, 407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 241. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810. 
 242. See JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *3. 
 243. This logic is similar to the protection afforded by the business judgment rule in corporate 
law.  Simply stated, the business judgment rule holds that corporate directors should not be held 
liable for business actions made in good faith, even if other boards would have reached an 
opposite conclusion.  Kenneth B. Davis, Once More, The Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. 
REV. 573, 573 (2000).  One rationale for the courts’ application of the business judgment rule is 
that business judgments are best left to business experts, i.e., corporate directors.  Id. at 580. 
 244. JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *3. 
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what amount of development would actually have occurred but-for the TIF.245  
Thus, municipalities cannot conclusively document that the project would not 
happen but-for the subsidy.  Rather, they are forced to rely on pledges from the 
developer that the but-for test is met.  Likewise, plaintiffs seeking to challenge 
a but-for determination have almost no hope of producing the documentary 
evidence required to show that the project would occur but-for the subsidy. 
In other words, these two tests, originally intended to supply adequate 
justification for government intervention in private markets, have failed to 
provide meaningful boundaries to when and where TIF should be utilized.  The 
tests are simply too subjective to afford the adequate accountability necessary 
to ensure the proper use of public money.246  As a result, the public is often 
outraged by the municipal use of TIF funds. 
In light of the dissonance between common-sense definitions of blight and 
the current statutory definition of blight, as well as the difficulties with proving 
the but-for test, options for reform should be carefully considered.247  Indeed, 
the legislature has considered reforming TIF several times.  These proposals 
have focused on limiting TIF to deteriorating, inner-city areas.  However, such 
proposals have failed to garner the requisite majority of lawmakers, in part 
because they would limit TIF to only the most deteriorated areas within the 
state.248 
In light of the current legislative impasse, there are at least two additional 
possible avenue of TIF reform for the legislature to consider.  First, the 
legislature could completely remove the blighting and but-for tests from the 
Missouri statute.249  Dropping the but-for test and blighting tests would result 
 
 245. Chapman, supra note 7, at 188.  Often, in fact, there is a give-and-take process of 
negotiation between the municipalities and the developers, which indicates the variability of the 
necessity of the public subsidy.  For instance, in a TIF project that was supposed to occur in 
Olivette, Missouri, the developers initially stated that $41 million in TIF was necessary to finance 
the project.  Dan Mihalopoulos, Olivette Mulls $39.5 Million Subsidy for Plaza Report on 
Shopping Center, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, April 12, 1999 (West Post), at A1.  The city 
however, had sent a letter to the homeowners stating that they did not want to give more than $35 
million in TIF to the project.  The developer relented, and was prepared to perform the 
redevelopment for $35 million (indicating that the “but for” test was not absolute, but was open to 
negotiation. 
 246. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STUDY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 
COSTS, BENEFITS, AND OVERALL IMPACTS OF THE STATE OF OHIO’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMS 24 (1999) [hereinafter ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STUDY ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
REPORT].  The contents of this report do not reflect the views of the State of Ohio or a consensus 
of the Economic Development Study Advisory Committee. 
 247. Most proposals for reform have attempted to limit TIF to areas of “pervasive poverty” or 
high unemployment. 
 248. See Eric Stern, State Legislators Debate Measure to Restrict TIFs, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Feb. 9, 2000, at B1. 
 249. Of course, TIF would remain subject to the procedural tests discussed earlier in supra 
notes 83-114 and accompanying text. 
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in no more TIF plans being adopted by municipalities than are adopted under 
the current system—in large part because the municipality has built-in, well-
defined procedural checks that limit the use of TIF.250  However, in dropping 
these tests, the municipality (and, ultimately, the courts) would be freed from 
being forced to make irrational declarations of blight that do not correspond to 
common-sense notions of the term. 
Alternatively, the blighting and but-for tests could be discarded in favor of 
a more realistic, intuitive test.  Such a test would recognize that TIF is no 
longer a limited-purpose development tool, but rather has evolved into a 
general-purpose economic development engine.  For example, the Missouri 
legislature could revise the Missouri Real Property Tax Increment Allocation 
Act to allow TIF to be utilized by municipalities based on one of the following 
eight justifications: 
1. Occurrence of a private market failure; 
2. Problem created by an unintended government policy impact; 
3. Occurrence of a sudden and severe economic dislocation; 
4. Presence of structural barriers impeding the economic advance of certain 
population groups (minorities, disadvantaged populations, etc.); 
5. Presence of a serious competitive disadvantage impeding economic 
development; 
6. Situation that threatens an established or emerging industry that is 
strategically important to state or local economic vitality; 
7. Opportunity exists that offers the potential to produce an overwhelming 
positive public benefit; or 
8. Situation exists to stimulate valuable and significant regional, 
intergovernmental, or public-private cooperation and benefit.251 
This test, being considered currently by the State of Ohio, would provide 
more logical justifications for the municipal use of TIF, but would not limit 
TIF to certain municipalities based on arbitrary economic criteria.  There is, 
however, one major problem with discarding the blighting and but-for tests.  
The intent of these tests, at the time they were instituted, was to ensure that TIF 
would be used in urban areas of the greatest need.  Therefore, any changes to 
the TIF statute should take into account the needs of these communities.  
Perhaps, as some critics have suggested, a “Super TIF” arrangement could be 
 
 250. These checks include representation on TIF commissions by the affected school boards, 
taxing districts and (at times) the county.  See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. 
 251. These justifications were suggested in the ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STUDY ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 246, at 24. 
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instituted for these communities, allowing them to tap into some form of state 
matching funds for TIF projects in truly needy areas.252  Such a Super TIF 
would, in theory, stimulate additional development in the most needy areas, 
including urban areas and inner-ring suburbs. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
Ockham’s Razor is the philosophical principle that the simplest solution to 
a problem is often the best one.253  The simplest solution—and perhaps the best 
solution—for the problems associated with TIF would be to discard the 
blighting and but-for tests, and possibly replace these tests with a more 
workable, intuitive standard.  At the very least, through such changes TIF 
would be properly aligned with its broad present-day uses.  Secondly, such 
changes should spur the legislature to look more closely at areas which TIF 
was intended to help but failed to reach.  In taking these steps, the legislature 
would address most, if not all, of the concerns connected with tax increment 
financing in Missouri. 
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 252. 1998 PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 57, at 4.  Kansas City allows for a “super TIF” 
program described as follows: “Under a normal TIF plan, 50 percent of the local economic 
activity taxes increment is available to reimburse eligible costs.  Under Super TIF, all of [the] 
economic activity taxes are made available.”  Id. 
 253. More precisely, Ockham’s Razor stands for the proposition that “terms, concepts, and 
assumptions must not be multiplied beyond necessity.”  NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 876 
(10th ed. 1997). 
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